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PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF
LIABILITY REGIMES FOR INJURIES
CAUSED BY PERSONS WITH ALZHEIMER'S
DISEASE
Edward P. Richards*
I. INTRODUCTION
People in the United States and the developed world are living
longer than ever before. While gains in the average life expectancy
have been modest, these gains greatly underestimate the growth of
the elderly population. 1 Most of this elderly population is healthier
and more active in everyday life than people of comparable age in
decades past. The amelioration of many of the diseases of age has
accentuated the problems of the chronic diseases for which there are
no effective treatments. Perhaps the most devastating of these is
Alzheimer's disease, a progressive dementia leading to incapacity
and death. 2 As discussed in the other articles in this symposium,

*

B.A., Rice University; J.D., University of Houston Law Center; M.P.H., University of

Texas School of Public Health; Professor of Law, University of Missouri Kansas City School
of Law; Director, Center for Public Health Law-http:/lplague.law.umkc. edu. The author
wishes to thank Professor Nancy Levit for her review and comments on the draft of the article
and Associate Library Director Larey Maclachlin and Graduate Fellow Hudson Luce for their
research assistance.
1 Average life expectancy is strongly influenced by deaths of the young. Substantial
increases in the survival rates of persons over the age of the average life expectancy raise the
average life expectancy itself relatively little. More generally, mortality measures provide
only a limited view of the health of a population. For a more detailed discussion of the
problems related 00 mortality measures, see SUMMARIZING POPULATION HEALTH: DIRECTIONS

FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF POPULATIONS METRICS (Marilyn J. Field &
Marthe R. Gold eds., 1998).
1 &e Richard Mayeux & Mary Sano, Drug Therapy: Treatment ofAlzheimer's Disease,

341 NEW ENO. J. MED. 1670, 1670 (1999):

Alzheimer's disease, which is characterued by progresaive loss of memory
and cognitive function, affects 15 million people worldwide. The incidence
increases steadily from 0.5 percent per year at the age of 65 years to
nearly 8 percent per year after the age of 85 years. Because survival for
a decade is common the prevalence increases from 3 percent at the age of
65 years to 47 percent after the age of 85 years.
These numbers must be increased by the cases of non-Alzheimer's dementias, which pose the
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Alzheimer's disease raises significant legal issues because it
challenges our model of a world neatly divided into autonomous
citizens and persons legally adjudged incompetent and under the

control of duly-appointed legal representatives in secure facilities.

This article discusses the public policy implications of tort
liability rules for persons with Alzheimer's disease (PWD3) who
injure their caregivers or members of the general public, and the
potential liability of their caregivers for not preventing injuries to
the general public. The analysis is rooted in preventive law and
therapeutic jurisprudence concerns, 4 rather than advocacy for either
PWDs or their victims. The objective is to identify the proper
balance between tort liability, immunity, and non-tort approaches
such as public health reporting and management strategies. This
article recognizes that expanding liability will increase the pressure
on insurers5 and families6 to limit the freedom of PWDs, wbile limits
on liability may leave deserving persons uncompensated and create
a public backlash that will result in unnecessarily broad or harsh
restrictions of PWDs. Most troubling are the perverse incentives
created by the tort doctrine of duty. For example, because tort law
requires that once a duty is assumed, it must be carried out non
negligently: family caregivers who have no legal duty to prevent

aame legal iaauea. See Clive Ballard et al., Non-Alzheimer Dementias, 13 CURRENT OPINION
PsYCHIATRY 409 (2000); Howard A Crystal et al., The Relative Frequency of "Dement ia of
Unknown Etiology• Increases with Age and Is Nearly 50% in Nonagenarians, 157 ARCHIVES
NEUROLOGY 713 (2000).
1 Aa diacuaaed infra, this includes Alzheimer's disease and dementia secondar y to other
common medical conditions such as HIV infection . strokes ' and non-specific senile dementia.
.
.
See DaVld B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS
IN THERAPEtmC JURISPRUDENCE (1996); Dennis P. Stolle et al., Integrating Preventive Law
and Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Law and Psychology Based Approach to La wyering, 34
CAL. W. L. REv. 115 (1997); David B. Wexler, The Development of Therapeutic Jurisprudence:
From Theory to Practice, 68 REv. JUR. U.P.R. 691 (1999).
1 Aa an example, aaaume a jury awards punitive damages against a PWD who injured
someone in an automobile accident because the jury believes that it is gross negligence for a
�non with Alzheimer's diSeaae to drive an automobile. This will put pressure on automobile
1n�urer1 to deny coverage for PWDs or to price policies beyond the reach of most PWD
drivers.
. . ' �� that hold that institutional caregivers
can sue the institutionalized PWD for
.
lllJunes inflicted on the caregiver will prompt the institution and the family to demand
restrictions on the PWD. Holding families liable for the torts of PWDs they are caring for
may encourage the families to unnecessarily limit the PWD's liberty and could force early
PWDa into institutional care prematurely.
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PWDs under their care from driving may become liable for trying to
stop them without succeeding. 7
This article is meant to serve as a guide to the study of tort issues
created by Alzheimer's disease, and is not a definitive recipe for
solving those problems. It reviews the history of the applicable
doctrines and the current trends, but recognizes that jurisdictions
vary widely and that it is uncertain which approach, if any in
current use, is the best. The author proposes modifying the tort law
regime with public health and preventive law strategies. Most
importantly, the author wants to encourage further study of these
problem, as ·well as the collection and analysis of empirical informa
tion on the impact of tort law on the lives of PWDs, their caregivers,
and the people t hey interact with in society.
II. PATHOPHYSIOLOGY OF ALzHEIMER'S DISEASE
While Alzheimer's disease has been known for nearly 100 years,
until recently it was seen as a disease characterized by significant
mental impairment in patients for whom no other specific cause
could be found. 8 The diagnosis was not made until the PWD was so
incapacitated that it was obvious to all, except perhaps the affected
person, 9 that he or she was too impaired to engage in activities that
could endanger others.
Outside of injuries to caregivers, the

7

REs'l'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § S24A (1965).
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services
to another which he should recogni7.e u neceuary for the protection of a
third person o r his things, ia subject to liability to the third person for
physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reuonable care to
protect his undertakings, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increuea the risk of such harm,
or

Id.

(b) be has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third
person, or
(c) the harm ia suffered because of reliance of the other or the third
person upon the undertaking.

' While there are specific pathologic signs of Alzheimer's disease in the brain, in the past
theae could only be determined by an autopsy.
• The afrected person may never become aware of the diseaae because it ia self-muking:
it often impairs precisely the higher mental functions that are neceuary to be self-aware that
one ia becoming impaired. See Mayeux & Sano, supra note 2, at 1670 (stating definite cases
of Alzheimer's are only confirmed post-mortem).
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Alzheimer's disease patient did not pose significant risks to the
public because they were too impaired to drive or engage in other
risky behavior. In this period, a blanket rule that all persons
diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease would lose their driver's license
would not have been controversial because Alzheimer's disease was
not diagnosed until the patient was clearly too incapacitated to
drive.
The legal status of dementia is changing, however, as diagnostic
tests are developed that allow Alzheimer's disease to be diagnosed
long before it affects behavior, and as it is recognized that dementia
0
is an important symptom of other diseases, 1 such as HIV
infection.11 Now Alzheimer's disease can be diagnosed well before
it im- pairs the ability to drive or has other affects on gross behav
2
ior. New tests, including genetic testing, 1 may allow diagnosis
years or decades before the first symptomatic manifestations of the
disease.13 Once diagnosed, the current view is that the decline to
total incapacity is inevitable and is usually averted only through
death due to concomitant illness, 14 but the course is highly variable,

10

Ballard et al., supra note 2.
Thia article will use HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) infection rather the term
AIDS (acquired immunodeficiency syndrome), which is only a symptom complex of some
persona infected with the lflV virus. This distinction is important because dementia is often
the first manifestation oflilV infection in persons who otherwise do not have the symptoms
that trigger the diagnoais of AIDS. Until the definition of AIDS was revised to include
dementia, it was common for individuals to have disabling HIV dementia without meeting
the definition fur AIDS.
11 See,
e.g., Kaj ab Blennow & Ingmar C. Skoog, Genetic Testing for Alzheimer's Disease:
How Close is Reality?, 12 PSYCIUATRY 487 (1999 ); Jean Francois Dartigues & Luc Letenneur,
11

Genetic Epidemiology of Alzheimer's Disease, 13 NEUROLOGY 385 (2000); M.B. Liddell et al.,
Genetic Risk of Alzheimer's Disease: Advising Relatives, 178 BRIT J. PSYCHIATRY 7 (2001).
18
Ingmar Skoog, Detection of Preclinical Alzheimer's Disease, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 502
.

(2000). Aa diagnostic tests shift from measures of behavior to biochemical and genetic
markers, it is expected that many people diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease will live fo r
years without impairment, dying o f other conditions without ever showing sympto ms o f
Alzheimer's disease. This is already reflected in autopsy da ta that shows that significantly
more people have the characteristic lesions ofAlzheimer's disease in their brains than were
diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease at the time of death.
14
There are findings characteristic of Alzheimer's disease in the brains of many people
w o die before developing overt symptoms. The recent extension of the diagnosis to persons
with few or no overt symptoms raises the possibility that some persons who are diagnosed
with Alzheimer's disease before any clinical signs develop may have an arrested clinical
course and not develop the characteristics of Alzheimer's disease. Until there has been
sufficie!1t time to observe the course of the disease in these persons, it is impossible to
determine whether those persons with brain pathology consistent with Alzheimer's disease,

�
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with some patients declining very quickly and others over a
substantial number of years. Despite the significant risks posed by
drivers with symptomatic Alzheimer's disease, 15 it would be diffi cult
to justify blanket rules that prohibit all persons diagnosed with
Alzheimer's disease from driving because such rules would improp
erly limit the lives of a large number of persons who do not yet pose
any threat to others.16
There is an established jurisprudence and regulatory structure
for insanity, which courts use as precedent when analyzing cases
involving Alzheimer's disease. Much of the legal analysis of mental
impairment is p erformed in the criminal context and involves
specific mental illnesses such as paranoid schizophrenia that have
characteristic psychology

profiles

and behavior patterns, or
conditions such as pedophilia which, by their nature, involve
violations of the law. The thesis of this paper is that Alzheimer's
disease differs from traditional legal notions of insanity in several
key ways that undermine the rigid application of this precedent to
PWDs. These characteristics are rooted in the pathophysiology of
the disease, and while none are exclusive to Alzheimer's disease, 17

but who were asymptomatic, would have developed symptoms had they just lived longer.
18
Richard M. Dubinsky et al., Practice Parameter: Risk of Driving and AlzMimer's
Disease (An Evidence·Based Review): Report of the Quality Standards Subcommitt ee of the
American Academy of Neurology, 64 NEUROLOGY 2205, 2209·10 (2000); Gillian K Fox et al.,
Alzheimer's Disease and Driving: Prediction and Assessment of Driving Performance, 45 J.
AM. GERIATRIC Soe'Y 949 (1997).
18
In most cities, and almost all rural areas, being able to drive an automobile is essential
for the basic tasks of life, including working and shopping for food and household goods.
There is no adequate alternative transportation; therefore, depriving individuals of their
driver's licenses can effectively impri8on them in their homes. The social cost of providing
alternative transportation and support fur such persons would make any such scheme
politically impoaaible, without regard to its constitutional questionability. For a discussion
of the limited impact of early Alzheimer's disease on driving, see Jonathan D. Trobe et al.,
Crashes and ViolationsAmong Drivers with Alzheimer Disease, 53 .ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 411

(1996).
17

Another common cause of dementia is lilV infection, which has a direct detrimental

effect on the brain of many infected persons:
Approximately one third of adults and half of children with the acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) eventually have neurologic complica
tions, which are directly attributable to infection of the brain by the
human immunodeficiency virus type 1 (HIV·l). Neurologic problems
occur even in the absence of opportunistic infection or secondary cancer.
Important clinical manifestations include impaired mental concentration,
slowness of hand movements, and difficulty in walking. This malady has
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a unique combination of these factors are associated with the
disease.
Demographics: The prevalence of Alzheimer's disease is already
much greater than any other equally incapacitating mental disease,
and it will increase dramatically with the aging of the population.
This will inevitably lead to more accidents and intentional injuries
related to dementia and heightened public pressure to compensate
the injured and restrict the liberty of those with dementia.
Progression: Alzheimer's disease is progressive in all cases and
results in complete incapacitation and death, given enough time.18
Legal rules must reflect this dynamic process, whereas existing
insanity precedent and competence jurisprudence is binary-the
person is either fully legally competent or incompetent. As a
jurisprudential matter, most of the law on insanity and mental
incapacity is derived from the criminal law, which does not prose
cute either persons who are incapable of participating in their
defense or are dead. In contrast, tort law claims proceed without
regard to the defendant's capacity or presence, merely substituting
a legal representative when the defendant dies or becomes incompe
tent.19 As a result, tort defendants who might have been competent
at the time of the accident might not be competent at trial or even
during discovery, and will be unable to assist in their defense.
Unstructured Care: The vast majority of Alzheimer's disease
patients are cared for by family members, entering nursing homes,
and other supervised care settings only when the disease is far
advanced. Most PWDs do not have systematic evaluations of mental
function to inform them and their caregivers of any necessary
restrictions on their activities. These caregivers are under signifi-

been called the AIDS dementia complex by Price and colleagues; a more
recent term is HIV·l-8880Ciated cognitive-motor complex.
Stuart A Lipton & Howard E. Gendelman, Dementia Associated with the Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 934, 934 (1995). See also David B.
Clift'ord, Human Immunodeficiency Virus-Associated Dementia, 57 ARCHIVE.S NEUROLOGY
321 (2000); Roger Higgs & Anthony J. Pinching, Frontiers in Care: A Case of Compulsory
Treatment in Aids Dementia. Case Study and Commentaries, 26 J. MED. ETHICS 61 (2000).
18
This inevitable progression is based on current knowledge. AB advancements are
made, allowing the diagnosis to be made earlier, it is po88ible that there will be a group of
persons who have Alzheimer's disease who never manifest significant impairment and who
were invisible in the past when diagnosis depended on substantial progreyion of the disease.
19 Stinson v. Holder, 996 P.2d 1238 (Alaska 2000).
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cant stress from the twenty-four-hour care necessary for PWDs.
They receive little community support and often are struggling
financially and poorly educated. These unfortunate circumstances
make it especially difficult for caregivers to assure that PWDs
receive proper care and medical evaluation, and limit caregivers'
ability to prevent PWDs from posing risks to others.

III. TORT LIABILITY DOCTRINES AND ALzHEIMER'S DISEASE
A. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS
The criminal law developed a jurisprudence of culpability based
on degrees of mental capacity very early in its evolution.20 Since tort
law evolved from writs of trespass, which did not require proof of
motive to find liability, tort cases did not delve into the nuances of
mental impairment, and instead used terms such as generic lunacy,
idiocy, or insanity. 21 If the defendant injured the plaintiff intention
ally or negligently, the defendant would be liable unless it could be
proved that the injury was either privileged or unpreventable. The

20 Legally, distinctions were made between those that were regarded as "natural" or
"born fools" and those that were lunatics. It was believed, and for many years argued, that
if one were a born fool or a child fool he or she could not be judged a criminal. The Selden
Society's THE MIRROR OF JUSTICES, stated the distinction as follows:
[T]hen as to fools let us distinguish, for all fools can be adjudged homicides
except natural fools and children within the age of seven years; for there
can be no crime or sin without a corrupt will, and there can be no
corruption of will where there is no discretion and an innocent conscience,
save in the case of the raging fools. And therefore Robert Walerand
ordained that heirs who were born fools should be in wars to the king, to
be married along with their inheritances, of whatsoever fees those
inheritances might be held. As to madmen we must distinguish, for those
who are frantic or lunatic can sin feloniously, and thus may sometimes be
accountable and adjudged as homicides; but not those who are continu·
ously mad.
SELDE N SOcIETY, 7 THE MIRROR OF JUSTIC� 138·39 (1896) (footnote omitted).
21
The Selden Society Year Books contain a decision from The Michelmas Term of King
Edward II (1309) in which The Honorable C.J. Bereford distinguished between what was
kno wn as a "born fool" and a lunatic. The born fool was someone who had quite literally been
born mentally incapacitated. The lunatic, however, was a person who bad at one time been
sane and later become m ad, continuously furious or mentally incapacitated in some way. See
SELDEN SOCIETY, 19 SELDEN SOCIETY YEAR BOOK HH (1904) ("[N]ote that if an infant under
age is a born fool, the King shall have a wardship all his liCe; but it is not so in the case of a
lunatic.").
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classic statement of this theory is Weaver v. Ward,22 a case in which
a soldier was injured by a fellow soldier. The court found that there
would be liability unless the defendant could show that the injury
arose from a formal military action or exercise.23 The plaintiff was
not required to prove any intent to harm, nor was defendant's state
of mind allowed as a defense.24 As part of the dicta in the case, the
court found: "If a lunatick [sic] hurt a man, he shall be answerable
"26
.
m t respass .. ..
This early distinction between the role of intent in civil and
criminal law continued, with most common law courts accepting
that the mentally impaired are responsible for their torts.26 The

80 Eng. Rep. 284 (1616).
Id. at 284. Weaver v. Ward is also cited as an early statement of the doctrine that
soldiers cannot sue the government or fellow soldiers. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S.
22

23

135, 140 (1950).

24 Id. One of the earliest cases to adopt and modify Weaver v. Ward to law in the United
States was Taylor v. Rainbow, 12 Va. (2 Hen & M.) 423 (1808). The Taylor court discussed
the case in terms of negligence, but followed the English court in not finding any acceptable
defenses except for matters entirely beyond the control of the defendant. Id. at 442.
211 Id. This was not at issue in the case and was only used to illustrate that while tort law
did not depend on the defendant's state of mind, criminal law did and would excuse the
actions of a lunatic who did have the ability to act with the necessary intent for a crime.
Grant H. Morris, Requiring Sound Judgments of Unsound Minds: Tort Liability and the
Limits of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 47 SMU L. REV. 1837, 1839 (1994).
• During the same period, civil law jurisdictions did exempt insane persons from tort
liability in many circumstances:
The curator ad hoc for the defendant based his legal position on the theory
that, under the civil law as applied in Louisiana, an insane person is not
liable for his tortious acts because, under the Roman, Spanish, and French
jurisprudence, and in a number of countries where the principles of civil
law are recognized, such injury falls within the category of damnum
absque injuria, and that, while the language of article 2315, R.C.C.. may
appear to be all·embracing in its scope, it is nevertheless an adoption of
the concept founded upon the old Spanish laws as applied in Louisiana
prior to the adoption of the Code of 1825; that the language of the article
had acquired a definite and established meaning which recognized an
exception or exemption from liability in favor of insane persons, and,
therefore, the provisions of the article shovld receive an interpretation
and construction consistent with the theory of law which prevailed in
Louisiana at the time of its adoption and which would cause it to be
harmonized with the general theory of the civil law as recognized in the
countries where its principles control.
Yancey v. Maestri, 1�5 So. 509, 510 (La. Ct. App. 1934). Since it was unnecessary to resolve
the liability of the insane in this case, the court did not decide whether this was an accurate
statement of Louisiana law. This has not been addressed by subsequent courts but related
decisions indicate that Louisiana probably follows the common law rule. Se Johnson v.

�
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courts also found that the mentally impaired were responsible for
their actions when they constituted contributory negligence, thus
preventing the mentally impaired from suing for injuries to
themselves when their incapacity put them in harm's way.27 There
are very few reported cases where the incapacity of the plaintiff or
defendant is critical to the resolution of the case, so it is difficult to
determine whether this was a significant legal doctrine or one that
was oft cited but seldom applied. It would be expected that most
persons so significantly impaired as to trigger the issue would not
have adequate assets to make litigation attractive. If the defendant
had assets, they were probably under the control of a guardian or
the court,28 which complicated a recovery.29
With the evolution of negligence theory came defenses such as
standard of care and reasonable behavior.30 While these do not

Pendleton, 7151 So.2d 332, 331S (La. Ct.App.1999) (Kirby, J., dissenting).
27 For an early discussion of this, see Hartfield v. Roper, 21Wend.611S, 619-20, 34 Am.
Dec. 273, 275-76 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1839).
28
One court said:
If a person has either a legal or equitable claim against the estate of an
idiot, lunatic or habitual drunkard, in the hands of a committee appointed
by the court of chancery, which such committee refuses to pay, he must
apply to this court by petition, for payment of his demand; and he will not
be permitted to obtain payment by means of a suit at law, unless such suit
is brought with the sanction of this court.
In re Heller, 3 N.Y. Ch. Ann. lllS (N.Y.Ch. 1832). Interestingly, chronic drunkenness would
also trigger the protection of the court. See In re Hoag, 4 N.Y.Ch.Ann.169 (N.Y. Ch. 1838).
29 Some courts also limited the damages against mentally impaired defendants,
espousing surprisingly realistic views of tort damages:
Ordinarily, in an action for a personal injury, the amount of damages is,
at least to a considerable extent, governed by the motive which influenced
the party in committing the act. Thus it is usual, and as proper as it is
usual, for the court, upon the trial of an action for an assault and battery,
to instruct the jury that the action is maintainable even though the injury
was accidental; that if intentional, yet when the act is done under the
excitement of strong provocation, it is a proper ground for the mitigation
of damages. And, on the contrary, that when the act is committed
deliberately or maliciously, it is good ground for increasing damages. In
short, in such cases, the damages are graduated by the intent of the party
committing the injury. But in respect to the lunatic, as he has properly
no will, it follows that the only proper measure of damages in an action
against him for a wrong, is the mere compensation of the party injured.
Krom v. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. 647, 61SO (N.Y. Gen. Term 1848).
30 For the purpose of this discussion, the political issues underlying the evolution of tort
liability, such as the rise of industrialization, are not relevant. For a discussion of this
evolution, see generally RobertJ. Kacmrowski, The Common-Law Background ofNineteenth·
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depend on the actor's state of mind, they do depend on the state of
the actor's mind: the mentally impaired will frequently be unable
to know or carry out the appropriate standard of care, nor will they
be able to behave reasonably in many situations. The law, however,
makes few allowances for the mentally impaired. The classic
statement of this doctrine is by Holmes, in this book, THE COMMON

LAW:
The standards of the law are standards of general
application. The law takes no account of the infinite
. varieties of temperament, intellect, and education
which make the internal character of a given act so
different in different men. It does not attempt to see
men as God sees them, for more than one sufficient
reason. In the first place, the impossibility of nicely
measuring a man's powers and limitations is far
clearer than that of ascertaining his knowledge of
law, which has been thought to account for what is
called the presumption that every man knows the
law. But a more satisfactory explanation is, that,
when men live in society, a certain average of con
duct, a sacrifice of individual peculiarities going
beyond a certain point, is necessary to the general
welfare. If, for instance, a man is born hasty and
awkwar �, is always having accidents and hurting

himself or his neighbors, no doubt his congenital
defects will be allowed for in the courts of Heaven,
but his slips are no less troublesome to his neighbors
than if they sprang from guilty neglect. His neigh
bors accordingly require him, at his proper peril, to
come up to their standard, and the courts which they
establish decline to take his personal equation into
account.31

Century Tort Law, IH
11

OHIO ST. L.J. •U�7 (1990).
OUVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 108 (1881).
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Holmes recognized that there must be exceptions for children of
tender years and for the physically handicapped.32 These are
blanket exceptions for liability but are based on the standard for
reasonable behavior by a person with the particular disability. Thus
a blind man who chose to drive a wagon through town would be
liable for any injuries caused to bystanders, but a blind man who
was injured because he did not dodge a run away horse could not be
charged with contributory negligence. At least in the case of
children, 33 early courts imputed the negligence of their caregivers to
the child, finding that even if a child was not old enough to know to
stay out of the road, the child would be charged with the negligence
of his caregivers. 34 The courts also rejected an assumption of risk
defense when persons were injured through dealings with persons
known to be insane. 35 This is consistent with Holmes' view that the
tort law must not be tailored to the individual circumstances of each
defendant and that the plaintiff is entitled to assume reasonable
behavior from all persons.
Holmes' view of insanity, which grew out of the traditional
distinctions between fools, raging fools, and lunatics, recognized few

82

Id. at 109.

A blind man is not required to see at his peril; and although he is, no
doubt, bound to consider his infirmity in regulating his actions, yet if he
properly finds himself in a certain situation, the neglect of precautions
requiring eyesight would not prevent his reco vering for an injury to
himself, and, it may be presumed, would not make him liable for injuring
another.

Id.

38 Since the early courts generally applied the same standards for children and the
insane, it might be assumed that the courts would impute the negligence of their caregivers
to an insane person as well: "There can be no distinction as to the liability of infants and
lunatics, between torta of nonfeasance and of misfeasance,-between acts of pure negligence
and act.a of trespass." Williams v. Hays, 38 N.E. 449, 41H (N.Y. 1894). The court in Willi(Jms

v.

H

Hays gives an excellent review of the law at the time. See generally id.
84

An infant is not sui juris. He belongs to another, to whom discretion in
the care of his person is exclusively confided. That person is keeper and
agent for this purpose; and in respect to third persons, his act must be
deemed that of the infant; his neglect, the infant's neglect. Suppose a
hopeless lunatic suffered to stray by his committee, lying in the road like
a log, shall the traveler, whose sleigh unfortunately strikes him, be made
amenable in damages? The neglect of the committee to whom his custody

is confided shall be imputed to him.
(N . Y. Sup. Ct. 1839).
n
Am. Dec. 273, 275·76
.
o
a

;9(���
�� =���C:: !:r!: t.; ��\'
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nuances of mental impairment. What are now recognized as many
varieties of mental illness, dementia, and mental retardation were
lumped together and differentiated functionally as to their duration
and whether they rendered the person significantly incapacitated
within the context of nineteenth-century society.

Holmes did

recognize that while many insane persons might be able to carry out
the tasks of life and should be charged with their torts, there are
persons so incapacitated that they should be excused from liability. 36
This is reflected in modern, specific intent cases which allow
insanity as a defense and where the defendant's mental impairment
prevents the manifestation of the requisite intent. 37 A variation of
this defense is the sudden incapacitation defense, where the
defendant is suddenly overcome by a mental or physical illness that
prevents him from exercising due care. The sudden impairment
defense is implicit in even the oldest cases in that the courts have

311

HOLMES, supra note 31, at 109.
Insanity is a more difficult matter to deal with, and no general rule can

be laid down about it. There is no doubt that in many cases a man may
be insane, and yet perfectly capable of taking the precautions, and of being
influenced by the motives, which the circumstances demand. But if
insanity of a pronounced type exists, manifestly incapacitating the
sufferer from complying with the rule which he has broken, good sense
would require it to be admitted as an excuse.
Id.
37 This principle does not apply in torts that require a level of specific intent beyond the
capacity of the defendant. See Wilson v. Walt, 25 P.2d 343 (Kan. 1933) (upholding jury verdict
for defendant in slander case and finding that it was proper to allow jury to determine if
defendant's insanity impaired his ability to manifest necessary intent to defame plaintiff);
Becker v. Becker, 138 N.Y.S.2d 397, 400 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) (finding that defendant could
not form necessary intent to defraud and stating that it "cannot agree that it [the law] applies
to actions to recover for fraud where the essential elements include intention to defraud and
deception . .. An incompetent is incapable of deception."); see also Polmatier v. Russ, 537
A.2d 468 (Conn.1988) (holding defendant liable even though his actions were based on insane
delusions and was not capable of necessary intent); Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Saboda,
489 So. 2d 768, 770·71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). The latter court noted:
Obviously, a deranged person who cannot form a rational intent cannot be
guilty of a wanton tort requiring a specific state of mind (actual or
constructive malice)-the same "wanton negligence" required by the
"firemen's rule." . . . The liability for compensatory damages of insane
persons for their acts or omissions is based on public policy rather than
traditional tort concepts of fault-but that liability does not extend to
punitive damages, nor can it be extended to any tort requiring wanton
misconduct.
Id. (citations omitted).
.
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always recognized that defendants should not be liable if the injury
was not of their making at all. In this sense the old cases do not
stand for strict liability, but liability based on some voluntary
action, even if the action was based on an insane delusion. The
usual statement was that "[i]f the accident was attributable to a
'superhuman, or irresistible cause,'-to an 'act of God,'-the
defendant would not be liable; that as a general principle no man
shall be responsible for that which no man can control...."38 The
special circumstance of acts of God excusing behavior was funda
mental to Anglo-American jurisprudence and was frequently at
issue in early cases.39 The general warranty of common carriers was
excused, 40 as was the obligation of contracts,41 and the usual strict
liability for the escape of prisoners.42 The act of God exception was
extended to persons who suffered sudden physical illnesses while
operating trains43 and then to persons driving automobiles.44

31 Rodgers v. Central Pac. R. Co., 8 P. 377, 377 (Cal. 1885). See HOLMES, supra note 31,
at 201·02 ("With regard to the act of God it was a general principle, not peculiar to carriers
nor to bailees, that a duty was discharged if an act of God made it impossible of perfor
mance.").
39 See, e.g., Holden v. Toye Bros. Auto and Taxicab Co., 1 La. App. 521, 1522·23 (La. Ct.
App. 1925):
An injury caused by the act of God or a superior agency without the fault
of defendant will not impose any liability on him. An act of God is defined
as inevitable accident without the intervention of man and the public
enemy. To constitute an act of God in such sense as to relieve defendant
from liability for injury it must have been so far outside the range of
ordinary human experience that the duty of exercising ordinary care did
not require it to be anticipated or provided against.
(citations omitted).
40 See Backhouse v. Sneed, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 173, 174 (1808) ("Whatever doubts formerly
prevailed as to the extent of a carrier's responsibility, the law seems now to be well settled
that he is liable for all lo88es except such as happen by the act of God or the enemies of the
state."); Williams v. Grant, 1Conn. 487 (1816); Colt v. M'Mechen, 6 Johns. 160 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1810).
41 See Harrington v. Dennie, 13 Mass. 92, 93 (1816) ("Now it is a common principle, that,
when a man is bound to perform a contract, which becomes impossible by the act of God or
unlawful by statute, after the making of the contract, he is excused from the performance;
and may plead such matter in excuse, when sued upon his contract.").
42 See Clark v. LitchfieldCounty, 1 Kirby 318, 319 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1787) ("That in every
supposable case of an escape, the sheriff or county are liable, unless the escape was effected
by inevitable accident, the public enemy, or the act of God."); Patten v. Halsted, 1 N.J.L. 320
(1795).
43 See Beiner v. Nassau Elec. R. Co., 181 N.Y.S. 628 (N.Y. App. Div. 1920) (holding
railroad not liable because of act of God).
44 See Carroll v. Bouley, 156 N.E.2d 687, 689 (Ma88. 19159) ("By the great weight of
,

,
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B. MODERN DEVELOPMENI'S

A survey of early civil cases involving insanity finds that most
cases involve the capacity to contract, to make wills, and to engage
in various business ventures. There are relatively few tort cases.
This began to change with changing technology. Modern personal
injury law is very much a creature of technology, and no technology
more than the automobile. Mental impairment becomes a much
more serious threat as the automobile puts a premium on quick
thoughts and action, and increases the potential lethality of an
accident by orders of magnitude as compared to a horse and wagon.
Automobile accidents are the most common worry for persons with
early Alzheimer's disease. Traditional tort law does not allow
mental or physical impairment as a defense to liability for a
negligent accident.46 If a driver's impairment prevents the driver
from properly controlling the automobile, then the courts find that
he/she should not be driving. The only exception to this rule is the
sudden incapacitation doctrine, updated to the special problems of
the automobile.
The classic case of mental impairment as sudden incapacitation
for an automobile driver is Breunig v. American Family Ins. Co. 46
Erma Veith, the insured, ran into the back of plaintiff Phillip
Breunig's car. At the time of the accident she was suffering from an
"insane delusion."47 Defendant insurer argued that Veith should not

authority a sudden and unforeaeeable physical seizure rendering an operator unable to
control hie motor vehicle cannot be t.ermed negligence.").
411 Thie presumption of liability is eo strong that a court found a ward liable for injuries
caused by hie property when it wae negligently maintained by hie conservator. Filip v.
Gagne, 177 A.2d 509 (N.H. 1962).
.a 173 N.W.2d 619 (Wie. 1970). Wisconsin waa a direct action atat.e at the time and thua
the insurance company waa a named party. This case is also precedent for the trial judge'a
latitude in showing the jury hie displeasure with the defense. The judge believed that the
insurance company should have paid up and not forced the nominal defendant to auffer
through the trial. Id. For an earlier discussion of thia theory applied to physical illneae, aee
Waters v. Pacific Coast Dairy, 131 P.2d IS88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942).
47 Breunig, 173 N.W.2d at 622.
The psychiatrist testified Mrs. Veith told him ehe waa driving on a road
when ehe believed that God waa taking ahold of the et.eering wheel and
was directing her car. She aaw the truck coming and et.epped on the gae
in order to become air-borne because ehe knew she could fly because
Batman does it. To her surprise ehe waa not air-home before striking the
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be liable because her psychiatric condition came upon her without
warning, thus falling into the sudden incapacitation exception.
Plaintiff argued that precedent did not recognize mental illness as
a defense to a negligence claim. The court first analyzed plaintiff s
claim that mental illness should not be an excuse, beginning with
the policy reasons that the mentally incapacitated are subject to tort
laws while not prosecuted for crimes related to their mental illness:

(1) Where one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss
it should be borne by the one who occasioned it; (2) to
induce those interested in the estate of the insane
person (if he has one) to restrain and control him; and
(3) the fear an insanity defense would lead to false
claims of insanity to avoid liability.48
The court accepted these uncritically, but then distinguished the
instant case from prior precedent, which involved defendants with
permanent insanity. The court found that wbile permanent insanity
was not a defense to tort actions, the sudden onset of incapacitating
insanity could be. 49 While not discussed explicitly by the court, it
could be argued that sudden incapacitating insanity does not violate
the general principles for holding the insane liable for their torts.
First, since it comes suddenly and without warning, the defendant
is innocent, in the sense that he or she continued the dangerous
activity in good faith, rather than being seen as putting others at
risk. Second, there is no legal authority to control a person before
the onset of the mental illness, nor would this be accepted as a valid
restriction. Third, at least in this case, the insanity was permanent
and thus did not raise the issue of faking to avoid liability. 60 The

truck but after the impact she was flying.

Id.
48

Id. at 624.
Id. The court relied on Theisen v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 1 18 N.W.2d 140 (Wia.
1962), which involved an accident caused when the driver fell asleep at the wheel. Breunig,
173 N. W 2d at 623. The Theisen court rejected arguments that falling asleep at the wheel
should be strict liability. Theisen, 1 18 N. W.2d at 144. Relying on previous cases involving
epilepsy and other sudden illnesses, the court allowed defendant to put on evidence that hi8
falling asleep was a sudden and uncontrollable event. Id.
�9

.

110

The incentive to fake is much higher in criminal cases, but the courts aeem able to
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court allowed defendant to go forward with its expert testimony
pertaining to the sudden onset of insanity as a defense and required
61
plaintiff to rebut the defense. While the court did allow the mental
illness as a defense, it used the sudden physical illness model, which
the plaintiff successfully rebutted by showing that Veith had some
62
premonition of the illness.
The California courts reviewed the applicability of the sudden
incapacitation doctrine to mental impairment in Bashi v. Wodarz. 63
Defendant Wodarz was involved in two automobile accidents in a
short period of time. This case involved the second, brought by
plaintiff Bashi. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing
that she suffered a sudden mental impairment and thus was not
responsible as a matter of law. The trial court granted her motion
and plaintiff appealed.

Recognizing that California has a long

history of accepting sudden physical illness as a defense to an
automobile accident claim, the j udge determined that no court in
California bad yet ruled on the Bruenig situation of sudden mental
impairment. 64

Unlike most states, California had codified the

66

common law rule that the insane are responsible for their torts.
The court further noted that when the law was revised, effective

secure

adequate expert testimony to continue using insanity as a defense. It is hard to say
whether the Breunig court would have ruled the same way had the claim been for temporary
inaanity.
51 Breunig, 173 N.W.2d at 624. The court noted that while the expert's contradicted,
it
need not be accepted by the jury and the jury could have reasonably found that the defendant
had forewarning. Id.
111 Id. at 624-2ti. The jury awarded plaintiff $10,000, reduced by the court
to $7,000. Id.
at 627. The award was complicated by the accusations ofjudicial misconduct, manifested by
the judge in the presence of the jury by a disapproval of the defense. Id. at 626. While the
court found the judge's behavior within the bounds ofjudicial discretion, it could be expected
that it had a significant influence on the jury. Id.
Sll 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 635 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
114 Id. at 638-39 ("Under a line of appellate authorities beginning with Waters in 1942,
these cases generally hold that a driver, suddenly stricken by an illness rendering the driver
unconscious, is not chargeable with negligence."). The Bashi court cited many cases
containing instances where a driver was not or may not have been chargeable with negligence
due to some sudden occurrence rendering the driver unconscious. Bashi, IS3 Cal. Rpt. 2d at

638.

115 The court noted that Civil Code section 41, as originally enacted in 1872, provided: "A
�or, or perao� of u �und mind, of whatever degree, is civilly liable for a wrong done by
.
him, but 18 not liable m exemplary damages unless at the time of the act he was capable of
knowing that it was wrongful." Id. at 639.
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January 1, 1994, the legislature removed minors from the law but
left the rest substantially intact. 56 The court found this to be a
significant statement of public policy, one that was bolstered by
comments in the Restatement (Second) of Torts that indicate that
the drafters did not believe that the sudden medical emergency
doctrine extended to mental illness.157 Driven by these findings, the
court rejected sudden mental impairment as a defense to a negli
gence tort and reversed the summary judgment for the defendant.
The most difficult question in sudden incapacitation cases, and,
more generally, in Alzheimer's disease, is determining when the
patient is on notice that he or she is sufficiently impaired that he or
she should voluntarily restrict his or her activities. This is illus
trated by Word

Jones ex rel. Moore, 158 in which defendant driver
requested sudden incapacitation instructions as a defense to
plaintiffs claim that she negligently operated her automobile.59 The
trial court granted these instructions, which the plaintiff argued
were defective because they did not require the jury to find that
defendant was rendered unconscious. The appeals court agreed
with defendant and remanded for a new trial because it found that
the court's use of the terms "confusion" and "disorientation" was too
vague.60 The supreme court disagreed, finding that unconsciousness
v.

118 Id.

57 Id. at

641. The court, citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283C cmt. b
(1965), discussed the onset of a "transit.ory delirium" as follows:

Id.

The same allowance (the reasonable man is identical with the act.or] is
made for physical, as distinguished from mental, illne88. Thus a heart
attack, or a temporary dizzinesa due t.o fever or nausea, as well as a
transit.ory delirium, are regarded merely as circumstances t.o be taken int.o
account in determining what the reasonable man would do. . . . Although
the respondent's sudden onset of mental illne88 might arguably be
classified as a "transit.ory delirium" under the Restatement, such a
clBBBification is unlikely given that the "transit.ory delirium" is discussed
in the comment relating to physical, as opposed to mental, disabilities.
(Since the Restatement makes a distinction between physical and mental
disabilities, it is more like)y that the phrase "transit.ory delirium" used in
the Restatement relates back to the previous phrase regarding the effects
of fever.

118 616 S.E.2d 144 (N.C. 1999).
59 Id. at 146. The sudden incapacitation defense is referred to in this jurisdiction as the
sudden medical emergency defense.
90 Id. at

147. The court stated:
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was too narrow a limit on the sudden incapacitation defense. The
court directly addressed plaintiff s assertion that Alzheimer's
disease could not form the basis of a sudden incapacitation defense
and established the standard for using this defense in Alzheimer's
disease cases:81
During the trial defendant presented three different
medical explanations supporting the defense of
sudden incapacitation: Alzheimer's disease, TIA,62
and arrhythmia. This evidence went directly to the
elements of sudden incapacitation. The testimony of
defendant's two witnesses, both qualified as medical
experts, in substantiation of her affirmative defense
was neither objected to nor controverted by plaintiff.
For example, defendant presented evidence that she
had not previously been diagnosed with and had
never before experienced any of the three possible
medical conditions which tended to show the second
element of the affirmative defense, namely whether
the incapacitation was foreseeable. Therefore, the
trial court properly submitted to the jury the issue of
whether defendant suffered a sudden, unforeseen
incapacitation which caused her to lose control of her
vehicle and caused the accident.63

Id.

Practical considerations also support a requirement of loss of conscious
neu aa an element of the sudden medical incapacitation defense.
"Confusion" and "disorientation" are somewhat vague, imprecise, and
subjective terms. They present the potential to foster fraud and abuse of
the sudden medical incapacitation defense. ''Unconsciousness" is a
workable, objective test that is more easily understood and applied to
meuure sudden medical incapacitation.

" Id. at 149 \PlaintifJ argues that submitting that defense improperly extends the
sudden·incapacitation defense to mental illnesses and deficiencies which do not excuse
negligence; plaintiff further argues that Alzheimer's disease does not cause unconsciousness
and that its effects are not unforeseen or sudden.").
.
a A �a �ient iachemic attack is a temporary clouding of consciousness caused by an
mterruption m blood flow to the brain. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1840
(29th ed. 2000).
11 Word v. Jones ez rel. Moore, 516 S.E.2d 144, 149
(N.C. 1999).
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While this case shows that Alzheimer's disease is not a complete bar
to the use of the s udden incapacitation defense, at least in jurisdic
tions that do not require a showing of unconsciousness, it also
indicates that had she had a prior diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease,
however mild, it is unlikely that she would be able to prove that her
sudden incapacitation was unforeseeable. If it was foreseeable, then
plaintiff will be able to argue that defendant was negligent in
driving at all, beyond the specific negligence that led to the accident,
and may be able to get a punitive damages instruction based on
defendant's behavior in knowingly subjecting plaintiff and others to
the risk that she would not be able to control her car. Strategically,
this will be a very powerful argument because of the combination of
the progression of Alzheimer's disease and time it takes to get to
trial.

Whatever the defendant's condition at the time of the

accident, the jury is likely to see a severely demented defendant on
the stand. Unless the defendant's condition at the time of the
accident was fully documented in a way that will be admissible to
the court, defendant will find it very hard to convince the j ury that
she was justified in driving after a diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease.
C. CLAIMS BY INJURED CAREGIVERS

Some PWDs are combative and dangerous to those around them
when they get confused or disoriented, and some become consis
tently Violent. This takes a great toll on caregivers and raises issues
of spousal abuse as well as potential tort and criminal liability.
Developing a model for legal responsibility to caregivers must
address the problems of both professional and informal caregivers.
The reported cases deal only with professional caregivers .

IV. PROFESSIONAL CAREGIVERS
The older cases, typified by McGuire v. Almy,64 analyze the case
from the traditional frame of reference that the insane are liable for
intentional torts a s long as they can form the requisite intent to act.
Critically, the courts did not accept as a· defense that the action was

.. 8

N.E.2d 760 (Mass. 1937).
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based on an insane delusion.65 In Almy, the plaintiff was a nurse
assigned to twenty-four-hour duty caring for defendant. Defendant
was locked in her room unless accompanied by plaintiff or other
caregivers, and had threatened plaintiff in the past. At the time of
the injury, defendant was in a rage in her room, having broken up
her furniture. When plaintiff entered the room, she saw defendant
brandishing the leg of a low-boy.66 Plaintiff called for help and when
it arrived they attempted to subdue defendant. In the process,
defendant clubbe d plaintiff, causing serious head injuries. Since the
jury found that defendant had the requisite intent, the court
reviewed defendant's argument that plaintiff had assumed the risk
of caring for defendant and was on notice of the danger defendant
posed.
The court rejected this assumption of risk defense, finding that
prior to the incident in question, defendant had not manifested
dangerous propensities.67 Finding the defendant brandishing the
furniture leg as a club did put the plaintiff on notice of the danger,
but the court found that by that time there was an emergency and
it was within plaintiffs duty to try to help defendant. Understand
ably, the court was unwilling to create a rule that would discourage
caregivers from helping the insane if they might be at personal
risk.68 This analysis is consistent with the policy that employees do

66

Id. at

763.

This means that in so far as a particular intent would be necessary in
order to render a normal person liable, the insane person, in order to be
liable, must have been capable of entertaining that same intent and must
have entertained it in fact. But the law will not inquire further into his
peculiar mental condition with a view to excusing him ifit should appear
that delusion or other consequence of his aftliction has caused him to
entertain that intent or that a normal person would not have entertained
it.

Id.

Id. at 761.
Id. at 763 r'Aithough the plaintiff knew when she was employed that the defendant
was a mental case, and despite some show of hostility and some violent and unruly conduct,
there was no evidence ofany previous attack or even of any serious threat against anyone.").
68 Id. at 763-64.
The plaintiff had assumed the duty ofcaring for the defendant. We think
that a reasonable attempt on her part to perform that duty under the
peculiar circumstances brought about by the defendant's own act did not
necessarily indicate a voluntary consent to be injured. Consent does not
always follow from the intentional incurring of risk. "The degree of
66
61
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not assume the risk of the workplace.8 9 It contradicts one of the key
policy justifications for holding the insane liable for their torts: that
such liability will encourage those responsible for the insane person
to ensure that those under their care are confined as necessary to

protect the public. If the caregivers who have been hired to protect
the patient and prevent the patient from being a threat to others
can also sue the patient, then the relatives may have less incentive
to protect the family assets by confining the patient. If the insane
person is under care, it may also result in demands that the patients
be restrained or otherwise restricted to prevent harm to nursing
home personnel. This would make it more difficult to ensure
humane care of the patient.

V. FIREFIGHTER'S RULE CASES
The court in Anicet v. Gant, 70 considering the case of an involun
tarily committed patient who could not control his actions, recog
nized that finding an insane person liable for intentional torts
because he acted voluntarily, even if deluded, was a pretext for
liability driven by public policy and not by traditional notions of
responsibility for one's own actions.71 The court distinguished the
plaintiff caregiver from the innocent member of the general public
who is contemplated in the policy of compensating the innocent.

danger, the stress of circumstances, the expectation or hope that others
will fully perform the duties resting on them, may all have to be consid·
ered."
Id. (quoting Miner v. Conn. River R.R., 26 NE 994, 995 (Mass. 1891)).
89 But see Van Vooren v. Cook, 75 N.Y.S.2d 362 (N.Y. App. Div. 1947) (indicating that
notice of defendant's dangerousness might preclude suit by long-term employees who knew

him well).
10
71

580 So.2d 273 (Fla. Dist.

Id. at 275.

Ct. App. 1991).

Instead, the conclusion that liability exists ia rounded squarely and
acknowledgedly upon principles ofgood public policy which, it is held, are
furthered by that conclusion. Almost invariably these considerations are
stated to be:
(1) the notion that as between an innocent injured person and an
incompetent injuring one, the latt.er should bear the 1088 ; and
(2) the view that the imposition ofliability would encourage the utmost
restriction of the insane person so that he may cause no unneceasary
damage to the innocent.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Instead, the court analogized to the firefighter's rule which contem
plates that confronting risk is inherent in some professions. The
risk of injury is internalized in the pay and benefits of the profession
and in return the professional gives up the right to sue third parties
when the risk occurs. Without such restrictions, the general public
might be reticent to call firefighters and other emergency workers
for fear of liability. The court held that the same rationale should
govern institutional caregiver cases. To rule otherwise could
encourage institutions to limit personal contact with patients in
favor of restraints and drastically curtailed liberty. The court also
rejected the rationale that such liability would encourage families
to better protect the public from the insane because the family and
the defendant had already done everything they could to protect the
public.
It is tempting to analogize institutional caregivers to public
safety personnel, thus resolving the liability problem with the
firefighter's rule.72 Herrle v. Estate of Marshall13 generalized the
concept behind the firefighter's rule through the doctrines of
primary versus secondary assumption of risk, applying it to the
nursing home caregiver situation. 74 The archetypical case of
primary assumption of risk is participation in sports events. An
informal touch football game led to California's explication of these

See Gould v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 282 (Wis. 1996).
53 Cal Rptr. 2d 7 1 3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
74 When California adopted the doctrine of comparative fault, assumption of risk became
a critical issue because it became the only action by the plaintiffthat could continue to defeat
his claim. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975). This situation forced the
California courts to sort out the conflicting usage of assumption of risk in past cases:
A3 for assumption of risk, we have recognized in this state that this
defense overlaps that of contributory negligence to some extent and in fact
is made up of at least two distinct defenses. "To simplify greatly, it has
been observed . . . that in one kind of situation, to wit, where a plaintiff
unreasonably undertakes to encounter a specific known risk imposed by
a defendant's negligence, plaintiffs conduct, although be may encounter
that risk in a prudent manner, is in reality a form of contributory
negligence . . . . Other kinds of situations within the doctrine of assump
tion of risk are those, for example, where plaintiff is held to agree to
relieve defendant of an obligation of reasonable conduct toward him. Such
a situation would not involve contributory negligence, but rather a
reduction of defendant's duty of care."
Id. at 1240 (quoting Grey v. Fibreboard Paper Products Co., 418 P.2d 153, 156 (Cal. 1966)) .
72

73
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doctrines in Knight v. Jewett.715 Primary assumption of risk occurs
when plaintiff engages in an activity that generally involves known
risks, while secondary assumption of risk deals with situations
where the plaintiff knowingly encounters risks specific to the facts
of the case at issue. Primary assumption of risk results in no duty
on the defendant to prevent or mitigate those risks, and that
defendant does not need to show that the risks were known to the
plaintiff personally. This distinction is important because it is much
more difficult for a plaintiff to prove or show facts which raise a jury
question in a primary assumption of risk case.76

Herrle is a key case because it involves a patient with Alzheimer's
disease who was confined in a nursing home. 77 She had a history of
being combative and belligerent: "The admitting diagnosis indicated
'She can be very combative at times.'

Likewise, the nursing

assessment indicated, '. . . becomes very belligerent at times. High
risk for inj ury.' "78 The plaintiff was injured when she attempted to
prevent the defendant from falling when being moved from a chair
to the bed and the defendant struck her in the head, causing serious
injuries. 79 In a traditional assumption of risk-now denominated
secondary assumption of risk-case, defendant would have to prove
that the plaintiff knew of the risks and unreasonably encountered
them, i.e., that the emergency defense from McGuire v. Almy does
not apply. However, defendant can claim primary assumption of
risk through a general showing that nurses are trained to recognize
and manage such violence, that patients with the defendant's ·

75
78

Id.

834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992).
Id. at 703-04.

Although the ditference between the "primary assumption of risk"
"secondary assumption ofrisk" nomenclature and the "reasonable implied
asaumption of risk" "unreasonable implied aasumption of risk" terminol·
ogy embraced in many of the recent Court ofAppeal decisions may appear
at first blush to be only semantic, the significance extends beyond mere
rhetoric. First, in "primary auumption of risk" cues-where the
defendant owes no duty t.o protect the plaintiff from a particular risk of
harm-a plaintift' who has suffered such harm is not entitled to recover
from the defe ndant, whether the plaintiffs conduct in undertaking the
activity was reasonable or unreasonable.
11

He"le, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 715.
" Id.
7t Id.
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condition are prone to violence, and that a nurse working in the
institution where defendant was housed would have been aware of
the nature of the patient population, even if she were unaware of
Having found that the
the specific proclivities of defendant.
defendant made this showing, the court found that the defendant
did not owe the plaintiff any duty of care and thus could not be
liable for her actions toward the plaintiff.80
The dissent in Herrle raises difficult issues in the factual
application of primary assumption of risk to plaintiffs circum·
stances. The firefi.ghter's rule is predicated on the job role of a
professional public safety worker who is trained to encounter the
specific risks of the profession, and, most importantly, is explicitly
compensated for encountering negligent and even intentional risks:
Probably most fires are attributable to negligence,
and in the final analysis the policy decision is that it
would be too burdensome to charge all who carelessly
cause or fail to prevent fires with the injuries suffered
by the expert retained with public funds to deal with
those inevitable, although negligently created, occur
rences. Hence, for that risk, the fireman should
receive appropriate compensation from the public he
serves, both in pay which reflects the hazard and in
workmen's compensation benefits for the conse
quences of the inherent risks of the calling.

81

In most jurisdictions, firefighters and police have separate disabil
ity, pension, and worker's compensation benefits than other
municipal workers. These are very generous, both in benefits paid
and in the criteria for qualifying for those benefits.82 In contrast,

80 See id. at 714-US (concluding that "primary assumption of the risk doctrine bars
recovery under these circumstances and [we] therefore affirm the trial court's judgment.").
11
Krauth v. Geller, 157 A.2d 129, 131 (N.J. 1960).
.
12 California's courts have described the fireman benefits as:
First, they receive special presumptions of industrial causation as to
certain disabilities. Second, special death benefits apply to public safety
officers if they are under the Public Employees Retirement System.
Third, if under that system or the County Employees Retirement Law of
1937, they are entitled to an optional leave of absence for up to one year
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many nursing home personnel, such as the plaintiff in Herrle, 83 are
minimally trained paramedical positions such as nurses aides.
These positions are poorly paid, often have limited benefits,84 and
carry few expectations ofcontinued employment. Rather than being
trained and hired to deal with violent patients, they are hired to do
low level nursing care and come into contact with such patients
through inadvertence or, as in Herrle, while trying to help prevent
injury to a patient in an emergency. In Herrle, the plaintiffs
injuries cost more than $200,000 and it is not clear how much of
those were covered by worker's compensation. 85 It is hard to justify
a claim that such caregivers with their marginal benefits and
limited job security are paid to encounter the risks of their employ
ment in the same as professional public safety workers. Since even
the firefighter's rule has exceptions for risks beyond those contem
plated in going to a fire, 86 the dissent argues that it is unjust to hold
that every employee of a nursing home has assumed the risks of
being battered by a patient.
More critically, the courts justify the firefighter's exception on the
special nature of the public safety employment. 87 The courts have

with full pay. Fourth, their permanent disability benefits are fully payable
despite retirement, and are not reduced by disability pensions even when
both are paid for the same injury.
Baker v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. Rptr. 311, 3 1 4 (Cal. App. 1982) (citations omitted).
13 Herrle, 153 Cal. Rptr.2d at 713.
84 In some circumstances they are contract or agency workers who have no benefits at
all.
Clearly some coats were covered because the compensation carrier intervened in the
t.o recoup its payments. Herrle, 153 Cal. Rptr.2d at 713.
18 Neighbarger v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 882 P.2d 347, 3152, (Cal. 1994).
The firefighter'& rule, however, is hedged about with exceptions. The
firefighter does not assume every risk of his or her occupation. The rule
does not apply t.o conduct other than that which necessitated the
summoning of the firefighter or police officer, and it does not apply to
independent acts of misconduct that are committed after the firefighter
or police officer baa arrived on the ecene.

16
case

Id.

87

Id. at 31515.
When the firefighter is publicly employed, the public, having secured the
services of the firefighter by taxing itself, etande in the shoes of the person
who hires a contract.or to cure a dangerous condition. In effect, the public
baa purchased exoneration from the duty of care and should not have t.o
pay twice, through taxation and through individual liability, fur that
service.
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held that these factors are not present in private employment, even
of safety personnel, 88 which makes it questionable whether these
factors should be found in the employment of nursing home
personnel. The majority opinion meets these objections by returning
to Neighbarger and arguing that the key point was not the pub
lic/private dichotomy, but whether the defen.dant had contracted for
the plaintiffs services. Thus, the taxpayers contract for fire services
and the nursing home resident contracts for care, each with its
attendant risks to the provider, while the defendant in Neighbarger
was a third party with no agreements with the plaintiff. 89 While the
court focuses on assumption of risk, it is more useful to look at the
problem from the perspective of the caregiver. The caregiver does
not assume the risk of injury in the sense that the old cases found
that employees assumed the risk of injuries and thus were estopped
from suing for compensation. Instead, caregivers accept that their
compensation will be limited to that available through worker's
compensation. Thus the nursing home residents, or others on their
behalf, shift the burden of compensating workers injured by their
actions to the employer through contracting for care. This is a more
meaningful analysis because primary and secondary assumption of
risk are about losing the right to compensation, rather than the

Id.

Id.

118

Id. at 357.
The moat substantial justifications for the firefighter's rule are those
based on the public nature of the service provided by firefighters and the
relationship between the public and the public firefighter. Fire fighting
is essentially a government function, and the public has undertaken the
financial burden of providing it without liability to individuals who need
it. Because of the relationship between the public, the firefighter, and
those who require the services of the firefighter, the individual's usual
duty of care towards the firefighter is replaced by the individual's
contribution to tax-supported compensation for the firefighter. This
relationship is missing between a privately employed safety employee and
a third party.

89 Id. at 355 ("Having no relationship with the employee, and not having contracted for
his or her services, it would not be unfair to charge the third party with the usual duty of care
towards the private safety employee.j. This rationale clearly does not apply here.
Defendant, through her relatives, did contract, seek, and need the services of plaintiff.
Defendant, through these same relatives, paid to be relieved of a duty ofcare. Defendant had
a rel�tionship of care receiver and caregiver with plaintiff. Therefore, it would be unfair to
now unpose on defendant the very duty of care that she had contracted for plaintiff to supply.
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contractual reallocation of the method and form of compensation.
More importantly, it obviates the need to assess the competence of
the patient90 and it removes the patient as a p arty to the litigation.
VI. INFORMAL CAREGIVERS
Most PWDs are cared for by family members or significant
others, outside formal institutions. They are subject to the same
abusive behavior as the institutional caregivers, but seldom have
the training or resources to manage it as effectively as do the
institutions. Their only resort in severe cases is to call the police or
emergency medical personnel. They are not covered by worker's
compensation and may not even have health insurance. If the
person they are caring for has some type of personal liability
insurance, they could sue under the same theories as other tort
claimants. While the insurance company might argue assumption
of risk, it is not supported by any of the policy rationales developed
in the professional caregiver cases. In the absence of insurance,
they are exposed to the risk of injury with little hope of compensa
tion. To the extent that this makes it difficult to care for their
family member, the state might, as a matter of public policy, extend
some type of disability and health insurance coverage to informal
caregivers, recognizing the benefit of their services to the PWD and
as a cost-saving measure for the state.
When informal caregivers call the police, or when emergency
medical personnel find an injured caregiver and call the police as
required by various spousal abuse laws, the caregiver is confronted
with the problem of the police arresting the PWD, which is usually
what they want. If the police do arrest the abuser, which they are
obligated to do under some spousal abuse laws, they do not have
proper facilities to hold and care for a PWD. These situations
demand a system that can protect both the caregiver and the PWD.
One system would use twenty-four hour care centers where a PWD
can be taken by the police or emergency medical personnel, and the

90 Assuming that the patient ia impaired to some degree. Thia doctrine should not shelter
attacks made with criminal intent, unrelated to impairment. Thus, mere housing at a
nursing home should not convey blanket immunity for torts.
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caregiver has the right to use such personnel vehicles for emergency
transport. Any such system requires rethinking domestic violence
laws so they recognize that the caregiver is not served by a system
that criminalizes the dangerous behavior, thus discouraging the
caregiver from calling for help in all but the most extreme situa
tions.
A. CAREGIVER LIABIIJTY

The legal issues and public policy concerns are very different for
professional and informal caregivers. Informal caregivers are
usually family members who volunteer their services with limited
community support. Professional caregivers are usually state
regulated and often paid through state and federal funds, as well as
private insurance. From a public safety perspective, it is arguable
that both should have a duty to protect their charges from injury
and to protect the general public from injury caused by PWDs under
their control. However, such liability comes with a significant price
in insurance costs, risks to assets, and resources that might better
be used for caring for the PWDs. The courts have responded to
these differing policy concerns with very different liability regimes
for informal and professional caregivers.
VII. PROFESSIONAL CAREGIVERS
Professional caregivers, especially total care facilities, assume the
duty to protect the patient and their liability is governed by the
same precedent as that of health-care providers in general. They
are liable for injuries to the PWD caused by substandard care, which
will be measured by expert testimony and the use of professional
standards documents. They will be liable for injuries to third
parties to the extent that they either owe a specific duty to the third
party91 or when they undertake a general duty of care that includes
81

The most common example ia the duty t.o prevent one patient from injuring another.
These cases usually turn on whether the caregiver had notice of the patient's dangerous
tendencies, although it can be argued that PWDs always pose some risk t.o others through
inadvertence. See, e.g., Bradley Center, Inc. v. Weaaner, 296 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 1982) (involving
patient who kills wife while on leave); Sylvester v. Northwestern Hosp. of Minneapolis, 53
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preventing harm to others. There is little precedent directly on
point for nursing homes and controlled living centers caring for
PWDs. Most cases deal with the question of whether a mental
institution properly released an insane person who then committed
a murder or other intentional tort. These divide into the Tarasoff"

line of failure to warn cases and the pure negligent discharge or
supervision cases. 93 Even in these cases the courts are reluctant to
find liability without very specific evidence of dangerousness,
sometimes including the identification of the specific victim.94

The best analysis is in Garrison Retirement Home Corp. v.
Hancock,9r. which deals with whether a controlled living center had
the duty to prevent a PWD (probably Alzheimer's disease)96 from
driving his car.97 Plaintiffwas a contractor's employee investigating

N . W.2d 1 7 (Minn. 1952) (involving patient injured by another patient who waa viaibly drunk);
Roettger v. United Hoap. of St. Paul, Inc., 380 N.W.2d 856 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (involving
patient injured by intruder); Freeman v. St. Clare'• Hoap. &: Health Ctr., 648 N.Y.S.2d 686
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (involving patient raped while in reatrainta); Delk v. Columbia/HCA
/Healthcare Corp., 523 S.E.2d 826 CVa. 2000) (involving patienteexually uaaulted by another
patient). For a general review, eee N. Jean Schendel, Potienta °' V'u:tim.-Hoapilal Liability
for Third-Party Crime, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 419 (1993); Adam A. Milani, �nt Alloulta:
Health Care Provuurs Owe a Non-DekllObk DUly to '!'Mr Potienta and Should be Held
Strictly Liabk for Employee Aataulta Whether or Not Within tM Seo,,. of Employment, 21
OHIO N.U. L. REv. 1 147 (1995); Gregory G. Sarno, Phy1ician'1 Failure to ProucC Third Porty
from Harm by Nonpychiatric Patient, 43 AM. JUR. PROOF or FACl'S 2D Play1ician 'I Duty 657
(1985).
12 Taraaofr v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 1529 P.2d 1553 (Cal. 1974).
•
See, e.g., Lacock v. United States, No. 915-315778, 1997 WL 22263 (9th Cir. Jan. 115,
1997); White v. United States, 780 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Semler v. P1yehiatric Inat. of
Waahington, D.C., 1538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1976); Hick1 v. United State•, 5 1 1 F.2d 407 (D.C.
Cir. 19715); Underwood v. United State1, 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966); Fair v. United Statea,
234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956); Panella v. United Stat.ea, 216 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1954); Williama
v. United State1, 450 F. Supp. U>-40 (D.S.D. 1978); Smart v. United Stat.ea, 1 1 1 F. Supp. 907
(D. Okla. 19153); Kendrick v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 430 (D. Aluka 1 949); Baldwin v.
Hoapital Auth. of Fulton County, S83 S.E.2d 1154 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); Eatate of Johnaon v.
Condell Memorial Hoap., 520 N.E.2d 37 (Ill. 1988); Allentown State Hoep. v. Gill, 488 A.2d
1211 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985).
N Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728, 730 (Cal. 1980); Bradley Ctr., Inc. v.
Weaaner, 296 S.E.2d 693, 694 (Ga. 1982).
• G
arrieon Ret. Home Corp. v. Hancock, 484 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. Di.at. Ct. App. 19815).
•
Thia case illustrate• the problem of eatabliahin1 mental statue at the time of an
accident. There wu no record of the patient'• mental statua until eeveral montha after the
accident. Id. at 12159.
" Id. Thia caae ia eapecially important becauae it ii one of the few that deal with
negligent injuries caused by a PWD. Most c:uea involve intentional torte and murder by an
inaane patient. &e, e.g., Bradley Ctr., Inc. v. Weaaner, 296 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 1983) (involvin1
murder of wife by insane patient).
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a roof leak at a retirement home who was injured when the patient
drove his car into plaintiff while plaintiff was standing by his truck.
Plaintiff sued the home, arguing that it was negligent in its duty to
prevent the patient from driving. The court analyzed the case in
terms of Section 3 15, Restatement (Second) of Torts:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third
person as to prevent him from causing physical harm
to another unless:
(a) A special relation exists between the actor and
the third person which imposes a duty upon the
actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) A special relation exists between the actor and
the other which gives to the other a right to protec
tion. 98
The court recognized that the key element, which also runs through
the informal caregiver cases, is whether the defendant had the right
and the ability to control the actions of the person under their
control. Defendant had taken significant measures to prevent the
patient from driving, which the patient evaded with remarkable
ingenuity.911 The court found that these evidenced defendant's
ability to control the patient. 100 Based on this ability to control and
the failure of the defendant to control, the court found a duty to the

Garrison Ret. HoTM, 484 So. 2d at 1261.
98 Id. at 1239 ("[T]he retirement home personnel attempted to immobilize the car by
letting air out of the tires, removing the battery cable, barricading it with Jane Rush's car and
confiscating Tom's keys. However, Tom obtained a second set of keys and always managed
to get the car back into operational condition.").
'00 Id. at 1262. Interestingly, defendant may not have had the legal right to interfere with
88

the patient's

car:

Jane Rush, the administrator of the retirement home, became concerned
about Tom Egan's potential use of the automobile. Both the car's license
tag and Tom's driver's license had expired. Consequently, Jane Rush
inquired of her licensing authority, the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services (DHRS), regarding rules or regulations prohibiting
Tom's use or ownership of his automobile while he resided at the
retirement home. She was informed by Betty Gunter, DHRS adminiatra·
tor, that under DHRS rules and regulations, she had no right to prevent
Tom's use of his car, or prevent him from leaving the facility.
Id. at 1239.
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plaintiff. 10 1 It is difficult to generalize from this decision because of,
as the court described them, the "peculiar facts":
Granted the duty of a retirement home to its resi
dents is not the same as that imposed upon the
operator of an insane asylum or a hospital facility.
Nevertheless, the evidence revealed that most of the
Garrison residents were senile. The gates were kept
locked for the protection of the residents who were
not able to take care of themselves if they got outside.
Some of the people, including Egan, had physical
infirmities .

Tom could not walk without aid; he
refused a w alker but used two canes. He had periods
of "rage reaction" and hallucinatory periods. Accord
ing to Rush, the administrator of the home, Egan's
driver's license and car tag had expired. He needed
a pillow to see over the steering wheel and Rush
testified that she believed him to be a dangerous
person behind the wheel of a car. The people in
charge of the Home were so concerned about Egan's
driving that they resorted to taking his keys, discon
necting his battery, flattening his tires, and finally
12
blockading the car so it could not be moved. 0
The court may be saying that a controlled living home obviously has
a duty to control such a badly impaired patient who tries to drive.

This is a logical inference, but the opinion can also be read as
acknowledging the principle that defendant caregivers must carry
out assumed duties non-negligently, but that there is no general
duty to prevent p atients from driving. The court states that while

the regulatory rules do not give the home the right to restrict the
patient, they also provide that patients that endanger others are not

101
Id. at 1262. The court found that a group home for tranaients and ex-convicts did not
have the power to control its residents and thus was not liable for their crimes. The court
justified this as a nece88ary rule to allow non-governmental charity organizations to operate
such homes as a service to the residents and the state. Lighthouse Mission of Orlando, Inc.

v. Estate of McGowen, 683 So. 2d
102

1086, 1088 (Fla. Dist.
Garrison Ret. Home, 484 So. 2d at 1262.

Ct. App.

1996).
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permitted to stay in such homes. 103 Thus the court implies that
defendant had a duty to act, but that this duty might have been
satisfied by moving the patient to a more secure facility.
The case leaves open the question of whether, in the absence of
a regulation preventing such patients from residing in the home, the
home could have avoided liability to plaintiff if it had not assumed
the duty to prevent the patient from driving. Mitigating against
104
this interpretation is the duty to protect the residents themselves.
This home, and most like it, have locked grounds to prevent patients
from injuring themselves by wandering away. Such precautions
clearly indicate the assumption of a duty to protect the patients
from inadvertent injuries related to sojourns off the grounds. 105 If
such patients are at risk from walking, they are clearly at greater
risk from driving, and the home would clearly have a duty to
prevent them from driving. While the duty to the patient does not
automatically inure to the benefit of a third party, p ublic policy
supports merging the duty to the patient and the duty to society
because they are mutually reinforcing.
VIII. INFORMAL CAREGIVERS
With the demise of interfamilial tort immunity, there are no legal
bars to persons suing their informal caregivers for torts related to
108 !cl.
Aa mentioned previously, one of the

Id.

HRS rules provides that a resident
who manifests behavior destructive of property, to himself or others
should not be allowed to remain in the Home. Another prohibited
residents from bringing unsafe equipment on the premises. The
administrator suggested to Dr. Garrison that he get rid of Tom, but he
declined becauae, according to the administrator, the facility was not filled
and they needed Tom and hi.a money. On this record, it appears t.o us that
Garrison owed a duty to Egan, to Hancock, and others to prevent Egan
from operating hi.a car in view of the knowledge it had regarding hi.a
driving capabilities.

1°' The classic line of cases involves patients who commit suicide while in mental or
general medicine facilities. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Lenaink, 669 A.2d 618 (Conn. 1990);
Brandvain v. Ridgeview Inst., 372 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) Muse v. Charter Hosp. of
Winston-Salem, �2 S.E.2d IS89 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995); Wackwitz v. Roy, 418 S.E.2d 861 (Va.
1992).
'06 For a cue involving liability for allowing minors to wander from a facility and inj ure
a third party, see Nova Univ. v. Wagner, 491 So. 2d 1 1 16 (Fla. 1986).
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their care. 106 Given the dependence and impairment of most of the
PWDs in the care of their families, they are unlikely to bring such
suits on their own. It is more likely that suits would be brought by
legal representatives of their estates, either court-appointed or other
relatives. The major legal issues in such claims would be establish·
ing the standard of care for an informal caregiver and the extent to
which an informal caregiver has the ability or even the legal
authority to prevent the PWD from driving or engaging in other
risky activities. There do not appear to be any reported cases using
these theories, but it may be that they are masked because they are
brought as spousal abuse cases or other tort claims that do not
involve care giver issues.
There are more cases involving liability to third parties. One of
the rationales for holding the insane liable for their torts was that
it would encourage their families to keep them confined so that they
would not injure others. This was only an indirect incentive, in that
it depended on the insane defendant having assets that the plaintiff
could reach and that the family had an interest in protecting these
assets. It might be expected that the courts would further this
policy by holding the family members personally liable for the torts
committed by persons under their care. In contrast to their rhetoric
on encouraging the family to take responsibility, the courts have
been very reluctant to find family caregivers directly liable for the
torts committed by mentally impaired persons under their care.
The case of Emery

v.

Littlejohn 107 is a good review of the law as

of 1915 and illustrates the traditional view of third party liability for
informal caregivers.

Plaintiff was shot by defendants' adult son,

whom the defendants were caring for after he had been released
from a mental institution . Plaintiff sued defendant parents for
negligence in overseeing plaintiffs actions, based partly on an
assumption of responsibility signed by defendants when they took

108

For a recent review of the doctrine, see Herzfeld 11. Herzfeld, 732 So. 2d 1 102 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1999), reu. granted, 740 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1999). See also Broadbent v. Broadbent, 907
P.2d 43 (Ariz. 1995); Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971); Anderson v. Stream, 295
N. W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980); Hartman v. Hartman, 821 S. W.2d 852 (Mo. 1991). But see Ascuitto
v. Farricielli, 7 1 1 A.2d 708 (Conn. 1 998).
107

145 P. 423 (Wash. 1915).
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108

The court assumed that there
the son home from the institution.
was some general duty to the public, 109 but that this duty was
defined by the extent that the son's violent actions were foreseeable,
and that there was insufficient evidence that the son was
homicidal.

110

In reviewing the law at the time, the court found:

The diligence of learned counsel for respondent has
not brought to light a single decision of any court
holding a person liable for negligence growing out of
his want of care and restraint over an insane person.
A remark made by the United States Court of Ap
peals of the Eighth Circuit, seems quite appropriate
here, where they say:
"The absence of reported judgments and decisions
sustaining an alleged liability under a given state of
facts raises a strong presumption that no such liabil
ity exists."
We are not prepared to say that a private person
having the legal custody and control of a violently
insane person with homicidal tendencies could not,
under any circumstances, be rendered liable for
damages caused by such a person, resulting from
want of proper restraint on the part of the person
having him so in charge; yet no decision of a court
involving even such an extreme case has been
brought to our notice. m

1•

Id.

Id. at 424.

This ia to certify that I have taken 0. W. Pence on parole from Western
Hospital for 11188.ne. Knowing that he is not fully recovered, I assume all
responsibility for his actions while in my charge, and agree to care for him
and return him to the hospital at my own expense ifit becomes nece88ary.

'°' Id. at 427 ("The duty here involved, if any, was that of Littlejohn and wife to
reapondent •imply 88 a member of the public.").
110
Id. at 428 C'We are of the opinion that it must be decided, as a matter of law, from the
undiaputed facta here shown, that Littlejohn and wife were, as reasonable persons, not bound

to anticipate the unfortunate occurrence upon which it is now sought to render them liable
in damages.").
111
Id. at 428.
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While a majority of subsequent cases reach the same conclusion, 1 12
a number of courts have found exceptions when necessary to balance
the community's interest in protection against the risk posed by
persons under the control of informal caregivers. These cases are
predicated on the personal negligence of the caregiver and the
specific assumption of the duty to care for the relative. No modern
courts find vicarious liability for adult family members, 1 13 nor do the
courts find a legal duty to care for adult family members unless it
is voluntarily assumed by the defendant. 114 While not specifically
litigated in most cases, it is clear that there can only be liability if
6
the informal caregiver can actually control the impaired person. 11
The most important factor is whether the caregiver had notice of
the impaired person's dangerousness. A leading case is Alva v.
Cook, 116 which involved two sisters caring for their 62 year old
mentally ill brother. He was a World War II veteran with a history
of mental illness, but not of dangerous behavior. He kept a rifle

112

See Hansra v. Superior Court, 9 Cal Rptr. 2d 216 (Cal Ct. App. 1992); Kaminski v.
Town of Fairfield, 1578 A.2d 1048 (Conn. 1990); Barmore v. Elmore, 403 N.E.2d 131515 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1980); Fisher v. Mutimer, 12 N.E.2d 3115 (Ill. App. Ct. 1937).
111
For a good review ofstatus relationships and the duty to care for a family member, see
Touchette 11. Ganal, 922 P.2d 347 (Hawaii 1996). For a discussion of the legal effect of a
formal guardianship, see Sego 11. Mains, 1578 P.2d 1069 (Colo. Ct. APP· 1978). For an older
case finding a husband liable for his wife's crazy behavior, see Burnett 11. Rushton, 52 So. 2d
6415 (Fla. 19151).
114
Plaintift'a in these cases must first show that defendants assumed the duty to act as
caregiver. Thia ia illustrated by a series ofcases det.ermining whether babysitters had a duty
to care for children that they volunteered to care for, See Standifer v. Pate, 282 So. 2d 261
(Ala. 1973); Barfield v. Langley, 432 So. 2d 748 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Whitney v.
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 2215 So. 2d 30 (La. Ct. APP· 1969).
111 Carmona v. Padilla, 163 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742-43 (N.Y. App. Div. 19157).
Appellant's liability does not depend solely on her status as the grand·
mother of the boy who shot the arrow that caused the infant plaintift's
injury, nor on her status as co-owner of the property on which the incident
occurred. . . . Perhaps her duty to supervise her grandson was not, as an
isolated responsibility, as extensive as that of a parent-a duty probably
related to the powers that parents posse88 to restrain their children's
conduct. . . . However, the position the grandmother occupied in the
house and household where the accident occurred gave her much greater
authority to restrain her grandchild than would be enjoyed by a stranger;
and in circumstances where strangers are endowed with relatively slight
supervision for control over children they have been held to be under a

duty to prevent injury by children to others.
Id. See also Poncher v. Brackett, 515 Cal. Rptr. 59 (Cal.
116
123 Cal. Rptr. 166 (Cal. Ct. APP· 1975).

Ct. App.

1966).
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and, without warning, shot plaintiff dead when plaintiff drove into
Plaintiff alleged that defendants were
defendant's driveway.
negligent in allowing him to keep the rifle, have access to the rifle,
and in not having him committed. The court found first that since
California allowed the insane to possess firearms, it could not hold
that the plaintiffs violated a legal duty in allowing their brother to
keep his gun and have access to it. 117 Most critically, the court
found, in unambiguous language that defendants' brother's insanity
alone, without obvious dangerous behavior did not put defendants
on notice that he should be committed or that they should restrict
his actions:
In the absence of ultimate facts that Malcolm was
dangerous to himself and others at least sufficient to
warrant a reasonable assumption that a petition for
evaluation or commitment under the Lanterman
Petris-Short Act would be granted, we are not ready
to equate respondents' assumption of a moral obliga
tion to a guarantee and indemnification agreement in
respect of Malcolm's conduct on or off respondents'
premises as if he were a dog and to hold that respon
dents are their brother's keeper but at their risk. 1 18
While recognizing the importance of the policy stated in Alva to
encourage families to care for their own, subsequent courts have
recognized situations where plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to
get to the jury on the issue of whether defendant had sufficient
notice of dangerousness. 119 This is based on the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 3 19.120 There is some question about whether

117
The judge also commented that California allowed the insane to walk the streets:
"Public policy of thia state allows one to walk the streets even if mentally ill and, in fact, there
is nothing in the law which prevents the mentally ill from posse88ing firearms." Id. at 169
(citationa omitted).
111
Id. at 171.
Mathes' Estate v. Ireland, 419 N.E.2d 782 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
RFsl'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1966) ("One who takes charge of a third
person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not
controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent
him from doing such harm.j.

::
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just providing a home for a mentally ill and dangerous relative
meets the standard of § 3 1 9 : "Neither the defendant nor our own
research has disclosed any case in which a parent, merely by
making a home for an adult child who is a mental patient, has been
held to be "[o]ne who takes charge of a third person" for the
purposes of § 3 1 9." 1 2 1
The archetypical third party liability question for informal
caregivers is whether they were negligent in allowing the PWD to
drive a car. If the caregiver loans the demented person the care
giver's car, then the case is simply one of traditional negligent
entrustment. 1 22 The more usual situation is that the PWD has
his/her own car and the issue is whether, and to what extent, the
caregiver has a duty to prevent the PWD from using the car. Irons
v. Co le 1 23 dealt with a legally similar problem: when does the family
have a duty to restrict an adult child's access to guns? The court
found the family liable for a murder committed by their son, based
on their knowing that he had access to guns in their house and that
he was mentally disturbed with a history of violence. Irons is
predicated on premises liability, i.e., that the murder occurred on
the premises, but the core issue is control of access to physical
property rather than control of the son. 124 The court was careful to
limit its decision to actions taken on the defendant's property,
rather than finding a general duty to the community.

Yet the

court's analysis is based on general tort duties and is not tied to the
traditional common law analysis of premises liability.125 It is a

121
Kaminski v. Town of Fairfield, 578 A2d 1048, 1052 (Conn. 1990). This case involved
a counter claim against the parents by a police officer who was being sued for shooting the
son after being called to the house to subdue him. The court indicated that calling the police
to manage their son was clear evidence that plaintiffs were not able to control him. Id.
122
Frain v. State Farm Ins. Co., 421 So. 2d 1 169 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (involving entrustee
who sued for her own injuries, alleging that defendant should have known not to lend car to
plaintiff who was mental patient).
1211 734
A2d 1052 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998).
i:u Id. at 1054 ("This court specifically did not charge that the defendants had a duty
arising from a relationship of control over their son . . . as the charge was based not on
custodial control . . . but on a duty of care of the type . . . arising from control of the
premises.") (citations omitted).
1211
Id. at 1054.
We have stated that the test fur the existence of a legal duty of care
entaila (1) a determination of whether an ordinary person in the defen
dant's position, knowing what the defendant knew or should have known,
·
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small leap to extend it t o accidents related to the use of a car o ff the
premises of the caregiver when the access to the car was controlled
on the premises, and the accident does not involve the intentional
harmful conduct that makes courts very reluctant to extend liability
beyond the immediate actor.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
Tort law must compensate injured individuals and deter
dangerous behavior, while not discouraging desirable behavior. In
general, the courts hold PWDs liable for their torts. While some
scholars have argued that the mentally impaired should not be
liable for their torts,

126

this position leads to the demand for a police

power regime that confines or otherwise controls the risky behavior
of the mentally impaired outside of the tort system. This is an
unjustifiable denial of the autonomy of PWDs who can still function,
at some level, in the larger world. While the rule that PWDs are
liable for their torts is generally workable, it has unintended
consequences when applied in the professional care setting. When
the patient has either been confined or sought care precisely because
he or she can no longer care for him/herself, it seems unjust to hold
the patient liable when caregivers are injured.
At the same time, the tort law is reticent to hold caregivers liable
for the injuries that persons in their care inflict on others. There
are two main exceptions: 1) when the caregiver is on notice of the
dangerous propensities of his charge and has assumed control of the
person's actions; and 2) when the caregiver assumes the duty by
trying to prevent the dangerous activity, but fails. This rule and its
exceptions provide insufficient incentive for informal caregivers to
take steps to protect the public from PWDs, and it may actually

would anticipate that harm of the general nature of that auft'ered was
likely to reault, and (2) a determination, on the basia of a public policy
analyaia, of whether the defendant's reaponaibility for ita negligent
conduct should extend to the particular conaequencea or particular
plaintiff in the caae.
Id. (quoting Zamatein v. Marvaati, 692 A.2d 781, 786 (Conn. 1997)).
•• For a review of theae theoriea, aee Sarah Light, Note, Rejecting the Logic of
Con{iMmen.L· Can RelotioMhipa and the Mentally Diaabled Under Tort Low, 109 YALE L.J.
381 (1999).
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discourage such efforts because the courts may see these steps as
creating a duty where one would not otherwise exist. A more
rational policy would impose liability for inaction, but near-immu
nity for caregivers who attempt to prevent injury but nonetheless
fail.
As other papers in this symposium have noted, PWDs pose very

difficult legal planning and client counseling problems. In tort law,
a central lawyering problem arises when the progression of a client's
dementia between the occurrence of the tort and the subsequent
litigation renders him unable to participate in his or her own
defense. Courts should develop procedures to minimize the adverse
impact of dementia on the defendant's case.

Insurers, who are

involved in accident cases long before litigation counsel, should
develop legally admissible procedures to document the mental
status and functional capacity of PWDs as soon after accidents as
possible. This will help show the jury that the defendant at the time
of the accident was competent, even where that competency
evaporates by deposition and trial.
One of the central problems with establishing policies for PWDs
is the dearth of information about the relationship between
dementia and risks to third parties for both negligent and inten
tional torts. For example, it might be possible to develop driver
recertification tests that would identify impaired drivers before they
are grossly impaired. 127 And it might also be possible to determine
if all drivers should be recertified more often after a certain age, or
whether everyone over a certain age who has an accident should be
evaluated for possible impairment. The objective of these measures
would be to tailor the narrowest restrictions on PWDs that are
consistent with public safety. But the state can develop only such
measures if it systematically collects data on who has been diag
nosed with conditions such as Alzheimer's disease and how their
accident rates compare with the general public and with known risk
groups such as teenage boys. Only through a combination of careful
studies on the impact of Alzheimer's disease on individuals and
society and the impact of tort law on PWDs and their caregivers can

127 See, e.g. , David T. Levy et al., Relationship Between Driver's License Renewal Policies
and Fatal Crashes Involving Drivers 70 Years or Older, 274 JAMA 1026 (1995).
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the United States develop a humane and efficient tort policy that
meets the needs of both PWDs and society.

